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Motley: Miscellaneous

MISCELLANEOUS
I.

CAPAcrry 0F COUNTr

BOARD TO SUE

Westbrook v. Hayes' was an action brought against the
Board of Commissioners of Spartanburg County. Pursuant to2
powers vested in it by the General Assembly of South Carolina,
the Board determined that it would make no appropriation of
funds to the Spartanburg County Tuberculosis Hospital after
August, 1969. The hospital's board of trustees brought an action
invoking the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme
Court, and a temporary injunction was issued against the
Commission. The supreme court subsequently held, however,
that "the Board of Trustees is without capacity to maintain the
instant action and that such should be dismissed, thus making
unnecessary a discussion or decision of the other issues raised."3
The hospital board argued, essentially, that the county commission's denial of a new appropriation to them should be ruled
invalid, because the Commission was not explicitly empowered
to terminate the existence of the hospital (which was established
by the South Carolina General Assembly). 4 The petitioner
argued that the Commission could not do in fact what it could
not do by law; it could not, by cutting off funds, accomplish that
which the General Assembly had not specifically delegated
authority to it to do.
However, before the supreme court would consider the question of the scope of power of the Commission, it examined the
scope of power of the Board of Trustees and concluded:
The Board has not called to our attention any statutory provisions, or other authority, which purports to
give it the capacity to institute and maintain the instant
1.253 S.C. 244, 169 S.E.2d 775 (1969).
2. Act of 1968, LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2455. Prior to this time, the
Spartanburg County Delegation had annually appropriated funds to the
hospital. The new commissioner was granted broad budgetary control, inter
alia, over Spartanburg County agencies, commissioners, and boards. These
powers included the right to levy taxes, make appropriations for various
county departments, and control the expenditure of appropriated funds.
3. 253 S.C. 247, 248, 169 S.E.2d 775, 776 (1969). Among the questions
left unresolved by the court's perfunctory dismissal of the hospital board's
case were those whose resolution would affect the embryonic home rule
concept and have a profound effect upon the newly created county commission's
ambit of power. As the respondent pointed out, "[Tihe result urged by
Petitioners would undermine the foundations of the Home Rule principle,
which are being laid throughout the State." Reply Brief of Respondents at 8.
4. XLIII S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 74.
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action, and we are aware of none ....

The act creating

-the Board has to be strictly construed and where there
is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a particular
power, such doubt has to be resolved against the existence of such power.5
The court accepted the respondent's contention that the petitioner did not have the capacity to institute this action, but left
to another day the question of whether the petitioner could
institute and maintain any action. The court concluded that
"[tihe Board is simply an agency, instrumentality, or department
of the County of Spartanburg created by an Act of the General
Assembly."6
The court reiterated the rule in South Carolina that a county
can'sue or be sued but stated that, since the respondents were
to be regarded as "either Spartanburg County, or the duly authorized representative thereof, then it would follow that Spartanburg County is suing itself in this action, ....

71T

II. PossEssioN OF ALCouomC LQuoR
Lewis v. Gaddy8 was an action instituted by the South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission to suspend the
possession and consumption license (or to collect a fine of $700
in lieu of suspension) of the defendants, operators of Gaddy's
Owl Club in Myrtle Beach, because of the illegal possession of
legal liquor. The defendant's agent was accosted in the parking
lot adjacent to the defendant's place of business and was asked
to allow a search of his automobile; subsequently, agents discovered a quantity of legal alcoholic liquors. The Commission
found as a fact that the defendant's agent illegally possessed
legal liquor. The trial court, reversing, stated that Section 4-95
of the 1962 Code was not controlling and that the defendant was
within his rights pursuant to Section 4-29 of the Code.
5. 253 S.C. 247, 248, 169 S.E.2d 775, 776 (1969).
6. Id.
7. Id. To this writer, the courts use of "standing" to avoid the necessity of

considering issues important to the development of a sound "home rule"

system is an example of issue-dodging via procedural pigeonholing. Who does
have standing to institute an action questioning the Commission's use of its

purse string powers? The taxpayers of Spartanburg County? The patients of
the Hospital? Important questions concerning the validity of broad delegations
of legislative power to quasi-legislative bodies- especially in light of the pe-

titioner's allegation that no, or inadequate, standards were provided the
Commission by the General Assembly with respect to funding-have gone
unanswered.
8. 173 S.E.2d 376 (S.C. 1970).
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On appeal the sole question before the court was whether the
possession of the liquor was illegal, there being no question as
to whether the possession was for an unlawful purpose. The
crucial issue to be resolved by the court was the effect of section
4-29 upon section 4-95 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. The
supreme court, affirming the holding of the trial court, held
that the defendant's employee was in lawful possession of the
alcoholic liquors.
The Code sections in question read as follows:
Section 4-95. It shall be unlawful for any person to
store or have in his possession any alcoholic liquors in
his place of business other than a licensed liquor store.
Section 4-29. A- Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, it shall be lawful ..

. ,

for any person who

is at least twenty-one years of age to transport, possess or consume lawfully acquired alcoholic liquor in
accordance with the following:
(1) Any person may transport alcoholic liquors to and
from any place where alcoholic liquors may be
lawfully possessed or consumed; ....
(4) It shall be lawful for any person to possess or
consume alcoholic liquors on the premises of any
business establishment

. . .

provided the business

establishment meets the following requirements:
(a) the business is bona fide engaged primarily
substantially in the preparation and serving of
meals or furnishing of lodging; and
(b) the business has a permit ....

9

Section 4-29 was passed in 1967 and specifically repealed sections 4-96 and 4-402 of the 1962 Code; however, no mention was
made of section 4-95. The supreme court stated that
[s]tatutes in para materia, such as Code Sections 4-95
and 4-29, have to be construed together and reconciled,
if possible, so as to render both operative .

. .

. All

rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one
that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language
must be construed in the light of the intended purpose.10
9. S.C. CoDFm
ANN. §§ 4-95 (1962), and 4-29 (Supp. 1970).

10. 173 S.E2d at 378.
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The Commission's position (supported by Justice Littlejohn's
strong dissenting opinion) was, basically, as follows:
1. The legislature merely intended to amend the law
only to the extent that customers at a licensed restaurant could possess and drink alcoholic beverages
on the premises.
2. Since two other Code sections were specifically repealed by section 4-29, the inference arises that the
legislature intended to retain section 4-95 and, thereby, accomplish the limited purpose articulated above.
3. In support of the above position, there is a well
known rule that where a statute expressly repeals
specific acts, the presumption arises that it was not
intended to repeal others not specified.
4. Since the two sections are obviously in conflict, an
interpretation must be rendered; and the only reasonable one, consonant with the intent of the legislature, is that section 4-29 should be restricted to
allowing customers to possess and consume alcohol on
the premises of a restaurant.
Contraspectively, the defendant argued and the court held:
[It was the legislative intent and purpose to allow
both the possession and consumption of alcoholic liquors
upon the premises of a business establishment . . . notwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 4-95. Section 4-95 remains in full force and effect as to places
of business not within the purview of Section 4-29, but
was by Section 4-29 clearly modified so as to remove
and exempt from the application of See. 4-95 the place
of business here involved.1 1
The majority placed great emphasis on the phrases, "any
person" and "notwithstanding any other law." The majority
reasoned that
had the General Assembly seen fit when it enacted
See. 4-29 to prohibit possession, consumption and transportation by the proprietor or the employees of an
establishment holding a possession and consumption per11. Id. at 379.
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mit, it could have easily done so. Instead, it repeatedly
used the phrase "any person",12excluding only persons
under twenty-one years of age.
In effect, the holding will allow the proprietor of a restaurant
to maintain his own stock of liquor on the premises. What he
can legally do with this liquor remains to be seen. The court
also held that it was permissible to possess alcoholic liquors in
areas adjacent to the premises in order to transport liquors to
and from an establishment possessing a license.
III. EiMrxo

PROCDURES

In Yonee v. Lybrand"3 the petitioner taxpayer instituted a
suit praying for an injunction against the issuance of any bonds
by the County Council of Edgefield County. The petitioner
attacked the validity of a hospital referendum which was submitted to and approved by the voters of Edgefield County on
November 5th, 1968. The referendum authorized the County
Council of Edgefield County to issue general obligation bonds of
that county up to a maximum of $400,000. The funds were to
be used to construct a county hospital. The referendum also
bestowed upon the county council the power to levy an annual
tax for the operation of the hospital. The trial court sustained
the election's legality.
The South Carolina General Assembly authorized a referendum in regard to the construction and operation of a hospital
for Edgefield County in 1968 pursuant to the guidelines laid
down in the 1962 Code of Laws.14
The act provided:
The county council shall cause an appropriate notice as
to such questions and elections to be published in a newspaper published in Edgefield County on at least three
occasions, the first of which is to be not more than
12. Id. The reasoning employed by the majority to arrive at this conclusion
is exactly the same as that urged upon them by the dissent with respect to
implying repeal of section 4-95.
13. 173 S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 1970).

14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-115 (1962) provides:
Notice of the holding of such an election shall be given, by
publication thereof in some newspaper published in the County, at
least once not less than fifteen days prior to the occasion set for
holding the election. Such notice shall state:
(1) the occasion of the holding of the election;
2) the location of the several polling places;
(3) the qualifications imposed upon persons desirous of
voting; ....
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twenty-one days nor less than fifteen days prior to the
general elections in November, 1968. The notice shall
contain the following information:
(1) The questions to be voted upon,
(2) The qualifications imposed upon persons voting,
and
(3) Such other information as may be required to
fully apprise all persons of the nature of the
questions to be voted upon.'6
The earliest published notification appeared just 13 days
prior to the election. The county council also admitted that the
notice -failed to state the qualifications imposed upon persons
voting and failed to list the polling places. The respondent
a.rgud, however, that the general election itself was widely
publicized and that the notices about the general election stated
that each elector would be required to present registration
certificates in order to be entitled to vote. These notices also
included a list of the precincts and the names of their respective
managers. The respondent predicated his entire argument on
the unusually large turnout of voters (80% voted on the bond
question, 76% on the tax question) which they contended was
due, in large part, to concentrated publicity programs instituted
by both the proponents and the opponents of the bond issue.
This exceedingly large turnout, 16 the respondent concluded, con-

stituted substantial compliance with the statutory requirements
regulating contents of election notices.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision and
upheld the validity of the election.' 7 The court, while ack15. 173 S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 1970).
16. Respondent compared the 80% and 7696 figures with what it alleged to

be the national average (50%) for voter participation. Respondent's Brief
at 5.
17. 173 S.E.2d at 150. The conclusions reached by the supreme court
comport both with the decisions of most states and with sound reasoning.
Florida held valid a bond issue in which official notice was admittedly defective
because publicity in general was very heavy, a large turnout of voters occurred,
and there was no showing of fraud. State v. Sarasota County, 155 So. 2d
543 (Fla. 1963). Kentucky likewise upheld a bond election in which the
deviation from the statutory notice requisites was much greater than that in the
instant case (publication occurred on only three occasions whereas the statute
required continuous daily publication for at least 30 days prior to the election.)
The Kentucky court also noted that pre-election non-official publicity lent
itself to voter cognizance and further added that such bond elections should not
be invalidated by narrow constructions of statutes. Kenton County v.
Ankenbauer, Kentucky 293 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1956). The above cases are
posited upon de facto compliance with statutory requirements which were
effectuated through private efforts and by the fact that the bond issue question
took place during a general election.
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nowledging that strict compliance with statutory requirements
was the better route, rejected any inference from the record that
a "single vote was lost or affected by failure to publish a notice
in strict compliance with the statute. It is, instead, clearly
inferable that the publicity actually brought to bear on the issue
was far greater than would have been afforded by strict compliance alone." 8 The court cited with approval earlier South
Carolina cases to the effect that, "unless the result of an election
is changed or rendered doubtful, it will not be set aside on account of mere irregularities or illegalities."1 9 The court also
agreed with and upheld the proposition that an election win
not be rendered invalid on a mere technicality absent some
showing that some persons were deprived of their right to vote
or the election outcome was changed or rendered doubtful as a
20
result of such irregularity.
Most fatal to the appellant's case was the court's support of
the following general rule:
The test for determining whether an election is invalidated for want of a notice prescribed by statute is
whether ... the voters have had knowledge of the elec21
tion and full opportunity to express their will.

In conclusion the court cited with approval the rule
that, where the result of an election is not made doubtful
nor changed, irregularities or illegalities, in the absence
of fraud, will not cause the expressed will of the body
of voters to be set aside, unless a constitutional provision
is violated or it is specifically provided by legislative
enactment that such irregularity or illegality shall in22
validate, the election.
The court noted that there were no such vitiating exceptions in
the present case.
18. 173 S.E2d at 149 (S.C. 1970).

19. Id. at 149, quoting from State ex rel. Walsh v. State Board of Canvassers,

79 S.C. 248, 248, 60 S.E. 699, 700 (1908).
20. Id. at 149, citing Harrell v. City of Columbia, 216 S.C. 346, 58 SXE.2d

91 (1950?.

21, Phillips v. City of Rock Hill, 188 S.C. 140, 198 S.E. 604 (1938).

The

appellant attempted to distinguish the present case from Philips by labelling
the statutory language in the latter as directory and that of the former as
jurisdictional but to no avail. Brief for Appellant at 7.
22. 173 S.E.2d at 150, quoting fron State ex rel. Birchmore v. Board of
Canvassers, 78 S.C. 461, 59 S.E. 145 (1907).
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IV.

ABORTOw

Section 16-87 of the South Carolina Code of Laws -an Act
to provide for legal abortions under certain conditions2 3 - was
passed by the 1970 session of the General Assembly of South
Carolina and amends previous Code sections 16-82 and 16-84.24

The new abortion law allows a licensed doctor of medicine to
perform an abortion in an approved hospital if:
1. there is substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would threaten the life or gravely impair the
mental or physical health of the woman; or
2. there is substantial risk that the child would be
born with a grave physical or mental defect; or
3. the pregnancy is the result of alleged rape25 or
alleged incest and, here, only if such allegations are
corroborated by an official investigative authority who
has issued a warrant for the alleged offender based
upon reasonable cause to believe such an act was consummated.
In addition, the Act prescribes a 90-day residency requirement
and calls for the written consent of the woman and, if she is
living with her husband, his written consent. The operating
doctor must first seek the certified counsel of two non-associated
doctors who have also examined the woman. In case of dire
emergency, the consent of the husband and certification by the
non-operating doctors may be waived; however, the latter, the
23. Abortion is very controversial. Criticism, both of older state statutes,
and of recently passed "liberalized" laws, is rampant.

The present abortion laws in the United States, no matter how

liberal in form, succeed in imposing a code of moral conduct
based largely upon Christian, and especially Roman Catholic
Christian, approved religious views by law . . . we must abolish
all religiously inspired legal prohibitions against abortions by physicians and leave the development and enforcement of morality to
the various churches and their respective members. 44 CHICAGOKENT L. Rav. 102 (1969).
24. Section 16-82 made it a felony for anyone to aid or abet an abortion or
premature labor if such act resulted in the death of the child or the woman.
Exception was made in a case where the abortion was necessary to preserve
the life of the woman or the child. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-82 (1962). Section
16-84 made it a misdemeanor for any woman to abort the birth of a child
or precipitate premature labor intentionally except where the life of the
woman or child was in jeopardy. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-84 (1962).
25. The question arises as to whether the alleged rape must be forceful, or
if an allegation of statutory rape will suffice. If the latter is sufficient, some
of the criticism visited upon recent reform laws is unwarranted in that this
loophole would allow unmarried girls, not of age, to legally abort the birth
of a bastard child. The alleged rape must have been reported within two
days and the alleged incestuous sexual act within 60 days of alleged offenses.
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certificate, must be forthcoming no later than 24 hours after
the operation. Such therapeutic abortions must also be reported
to the State Board of Health on the prescribed forms no later
than seven days after the operation. The Act also stipulates
that no physician or hospital can be compelled to perform such
an operation and that civil liability shall not result from such a
refusal.
Abortion-like prohibition and contraceptives before it; like
euthanasia, homosexuality, and ectogenesis, after it-will most
likely become a matter for the individual and his conscience,
not the state. It is doubtful that any government will be able to
impose effective restrictions which infringe upon an individual's
procreative rights at this juncture or in the immediate future.
RoNALD L. MoTEY
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